end
def create
+ # Note: the user could specify a owner_uuid for a different user, which on
+ # the surface appears to be a security hole. However, the record will be
+ # rejected before being saved to the database by the ApiClientAuthorization
+ # model which enforces that user_id == current user or the user is an
+ # admin.
+
if resource_attrs[:owner_uuid]
# The model has an owner_id attribute instead of owner_uuid, but
# we can't expect the client to know the local numeric ID. We
# translate UUID to numeric ID here.
resource_attrs[:user_id] =
User.where(uuid: resource_attrs.delete(:owner_uuid)).first.andand.id
+ elsif not resource_attrs[:user_id]
+ resource_attrs[:user_id] = current_user.id
end
resource_attrs[:api_client_id] = Thread.current[:api_client].id
super
def find_objects_for_index
# Here we are deliberately less helpful about searching for client
# authorizations. We look up tokens belonging to the current user
- # and filter by exact matches on api_token and scopes.
+ # and filter by exact matches on uuid, api_token, and scopes.
wanted_scopes = []
if @filters
wanted_scopes.concat(@filters.map { |attr, operator, operand|
((attr == 'scopes') and (operator == '=')) ? operand : nil
})
@filters.select! { |attr, operator, operand|
- (attr == 'uuid') and (operator == '=')
+ operator == '=' && (attr == 'uuid' || attr == 'api_token')
}
end
if @where
wanted_scopes << @where['scopes']
- @where.select! { |attr, val| attr == 'uuid' }
+ @where.select! { |attr, val|
+ # "where":{"uuid":"zzzzz-zzzzz-zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz"} is OK but
+ # "where":{"api_client_id":1} is not supported
+ # "where":{"uuid":["contains","-"]} is not supported
+ # "where":{"uuid":["uuid1","uuid2","uuid3"]} is not supported
+ val.is_a?(String) && (attr == 'uuid' || attr == 'api_token')
+ }
end
@objects = model_class.
includes(:user, :api_client).
end
def find_object_by_uuid
- # Again, to make things easier for the client and our own routing,
- # here we look for the api_token key in a "uuid" (POST) or "id"
- # (GET) parameter.
- @object = model_class.where('api_token=?', params[:uuid] || params[:id]).first
+ uuid_param = params[:uuid] || params[:id]
+ if (uuid_param != current_api_client_authorization.andand.uuid and
+ not Thread.current[:api_client].andand.is_trusted)
+ return forbidden
+ end
+ @limit = 1
+ @offset = 0
+ @orders = []
+ @where = {}
+ @filters = [['uuid', '=', uuid_param]]
+ find_objects_for_index
+ @object = @objects.first
end
def current_api_client_is_trusted
- unless Thread.current[:api_client].andand.is_trusted
- render :json => { errors: ['Forbidden: this API client cannot manipulate other clients\' access tokens.'] }.to_json, status: 403
+ if Thread.current[:api_client].andand.is_trusted
+ return true
end
+ # A non-trusted client can do a search for its own token if it
+ # explicitly restricts the search to its own UUID or api_token.
+ # Any other kind of query must return 403, even if it matches only
+ # the current token, because that's currently how Workbench knows
+ # (after searching on scopes) the difference between "the token
+ # I'm using now *is* the only sharing token for this collection"
+ # (403) and "my token is trusted, and there is one sharing token
+ # for this collection" (200).
+ #
+ # The @filters test here also prevents a non-trusted token from
+ # filtering on its own scopes, and discovering whether any _other_
+ # equally scoped tokens exist (403=yes, 200=no).
+ if (@objects.andand.count == 1 and
+ @objects.first.uuid == current_api_client_authorization.andand.uuid and
+ (@filters.map(&:first) & %w(uuid api_token)).any?)
+ return true
+ end
+ forbidden
+ end
+
+ def forbidden
+ send_error('Forbidden: this API client cannot manipulate other clients\' access tokens.',
+ status: 403)
end
end
projects / arvados.git / blobdiff